Parliaments are the institutions through which governments are held accountable to the electorate. They have a wide range of tools with which to carry out this oversight function, but until recently little analysis had been undertaken on the characteristics or use of such tools. This paper uses data for 83 countries that was collected in 2001 to investigate whether the oversight potential relates to three variables, namely the form of government (presidential, semi-presidential, or parliamentary), per capita income levels, and the level of democracy.
Introduction
In a recent issue of the Quaderni di Scienza Politica, Roberta Maffio published a comparative analysis of parliamentary oversight 3 in which she elaborates a conceptual mapping of the oversight tools, discusses the characteristics of oversight tools, and investigates whether the adoption of oversight tools by parliaments is related to the model of democracy (i.e. majoritarian, consensual, or mixed) 4 .
The analysis between type of democracy and oversight potential was conducted in a sample of 24 countries. Twenty-one of these countries are the democracies investigated
by Lijphart (1984) , 5 while the other three are Spain, Portugal, and Greece. Maffio divided the 24 countries into three groups depending on whether their government was majoritarian, consensual, or mixed. She then estimated the oversight potential for each country, using the 1986 data of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) 6 .
Maffio concluded that there is no correlation between model of democracy and oversight potential. "There are some majoritarian democracies with strong oversight potential (such as Greece) and others with weak oversight potential (such as Ireland, New
Zealand, United Kingdom)." Similarly, among consensual democracies, she found cases Aldeshot, Gower, 1986. characterized by both high oversight potential (such as Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands) and by low oversight potential (for example, Japan) 7 .
The purpose of the present paper is to investigate whether the oversight potential of parliaments is related to other variables; however, we present two major differences from Maffio's paper. First, instead of using the 1986 IPU data, we use the data that the IPU collected in collaboration with the World Bank Institute (WBI) in 2001. Our analyses are performed on the 83 cases for which the IPU-WBI data are available 8 . And second, in contrast to Maffio, we investigate whether there is any relationship between oversight potential and types of constitution (i.e. presidential, semi-presidential, or parliamentary), national income levels, and levels of democracy.
In the first section of this paper, after providing a working definition of oversight, we review some of the tools that parliaments can use to oversee the activities of the executive. We underline that oversight tools can be grouped on the basis of two criteria :
the first concerns whether a specific oversight tool is employed before (ex ante) or after (ex post) the enactment of a government-sponsored policy, and the second concerns whether oversight is exercised internally or externally to parliament.
Though the data collected by the IPU in collaboration with the WBI do not provide evidence as to the effectiveness of the oversight tools, they do provide some measure regarding the potential for oversight. Our line of reasoning is straightforward, as we suggest that a parliament's potential to oversee the executive increases as the number 3 of oversight tools available to that parliament increases. The second section of this paper investigates the adoption of oversight tools.
The subsequent three sections investigate how the adoption of oversight tools and, hence the potential for oversight, are related to and, possibly, affected by other variables.
The third, the fourth and the fifth sections analyze the relationship between the number of oversight tools and the type of constitution, the relationship between the number of oversight tools available and the countries' income level, and, finally, the relationship between the number of oversight tools available and the level of democracy.
In the sixth and final section of the paper we draw some conclusions as to the relevance of our findings.
The Oversight Tools
Before we discuss what the various tools that parliaments can use to oversee the executive branch are, we need to define what is meant by 'legislative oversight'. In a Research Paper of the National Democratic Institute, legislative oversight was defined "the obvious follow-on activity linked to lawmaking. After participating in law-making, the legislature's main role is to see whether laws are effectively implemented and whether, in fact, they address and correct the problems as intended by their drafters" 9 .
This definition captures the role that parliaments play in overseeing government policies and activities after they have been enacted but it overlooks that parliaments may be engaged in oversight activities well before a policy is enacted. Parliaments oversee the 9 National Democratic Institute, "Strengthening Legislative Capacity in Legislative-Executive Relations", Legislative Research Series, Paper # 6, Washington, DC, 2000, p. 19. executive not only with regard to the execution and implementation of policies but also with regard to the preparation of policies. This is why, paraphrasing Lees' definition of legislative oversight, we refer to legislative oversight of the executive as to "the behavior of legislators and their staff which affects executive behavior" 10 .
In overseeing the executive, Parliaments have several different oversight tools at their disposal. The most common oversight tools are committee hearings, hearing in plenary sessions of the parliament, the creation of commissions of inquiry, questions, question time, interpellations, the ombudsman, auditors general, and the public account committees 11 .
These oversight tools can be grouped along two dimensions. concerning the accountability of the government to the parliament, the impeachment procedure, the dissolution of parliament, the oversight of government, budgetary oversight, oversight of implementation of the budget, oversight over foreign policy, oversight over national defense policy, the parliament and the state of emergency, the verification of the constitutionality of laws, and, finally, oversight over the application and evaluation of laws. In this note we will focus only on the oversight of the government.
Respondents were asked several questions: whether the government in their country was considered an institution that must report to Parliament, how does the parliament exercise oversight, whether parliamentarians could question government officials, whether time for questions was allocated in Parliament, whether interpellations were foreseen and, finally, whether there was an ombudsman in the country 13 . These data are relevant in two respects. First of all, they indicate parliaments' potential for effective oversight by showing which institutional arrangements have been adopted to enhance oversight. And second, they can be used to investigate whether the distribution of oversight tools is related to other variables such as a country's form of government, the national income level and a country's level of democracy as measured by the Gastil index.
The Distribution of Oversight Tools and the Potential for Oversight
The data presented in Table 1 provide interesting information in at least three respects.
First of all, these data indicate that there is considerable variation in how common are these various tools of parliamentary oversight.
For example, parliamentarians can put oral or written questions to the government in 79 of the 82 countries for which data are available or in 96.3 percent of the cases.
Committees of inquiry and committee hearings are also common instruments of parliamentary control, utilized in more than 95 percent of the countries for which data are available. By contrast, interpellations and the ombudsman are substantially less common, with interpellations to the government used in about 75 percent of the countries while an ombuds office is instituted in less than 73 percent of the countries. Data are presented in Table 2 .
Second, the analysis of the data indicates that all countries adopt some parliamentary oversight tools and that most of them use more than one tool. Complete information is available for only 49 of the 83 countries that were surveyed; in the remaining 34 countries information was provided incompletely or was not provided at all (as in the case of Lesotho). In any case, more than 12 percent of the countries for which complete information is available use 4 tools of parliamentary oversight, more than 14 percent of them used 5 tools, almost 33 percent of them used 6 tools while the remaining 40 percent used 7. Data are presented in Table 3 .
Oversight Tools and the Forms of Government
In addition to providing information concerning the distribution of oversight tools and the potential for parliamentary oversight, the IPU-WBI data shed some light on how tools and types of oversight are related to another institutional feature, that is the form of government 14 . Here again, an analysis of the data is informative. First of all, the analysis makes clear that the number of oversight tools available varies from one constitutional form of government to another. As shown in Table 4 , tools such as committee hearings, 14 Respondents were asked to indicate what form of government was in their countries. Responses were coded : Presidential form of government was given value 1, Parliamentary form of government was given value 2, Semi-Presidential form of government was given 3, Parliamentary form of government in countries with a Constitutional Monarchy was given 4, Parliamentary form of government in countries with a Hereditary Monarchy received 5, and other forms of government were all given value 6. In our analysis, we adopted a different coding scheme. Countries that were given value 2, 4 or 5 by the IPU dataset were all considered to have a parliamentrary system and were hence collapsed into a single category. semi-presidential systems. See Tables 5a and b. As noted above, these results do not allow us to make any inference as to the effectiveness of the oversight tools, that is as to whether legislatures in parliamentary systems are more effective than legislatures in either presidential or semi-presidential systems in overseeing the executive branch of the government -only that they have more oversight tools at their disposal. assigning value 1 to countries in the low-income group, value 2 to countries in the middle-income group and value 3 to countries that belong to the high-income group.
Having created this variable, we then investigate whether there is a relationship Table 6 . Examining the distribution of each of the oversight tools by income level, the data presented in Table 7 suggest that committee hearings become an increasingly popular oversight tools as we move from low-to middle-and high-income countries. Such hearings are used in less than 91% of the low-income economies for which survey data are available, in almost 97% of the middle-income countries and in all the high-income countries. Hearings in plenary settings are not as common as committee hearings, as the data presented in Table 8 illustrated, but even these become an increasingly more common oversight tools as we move from low-to middle-and high-income countries :
hearings in plenary settings are used in only about 82% of the low-income countries, in about 94% of the middle-income countries and in more than 95% of the high-income countries. The use of questions and question time as oversight tools follows the same pattern that we have observed with regard to both committee hearings and hearings in plenary settings. They all become increasingly more common oversight tools as we move from lower-to higher-income level. Questions are used in 92.3% of the low-income countries, 97% of the middle-income countries and in all the high-income countries. Similarly, question time is used instead in about 79% of the low-income countries, 83 % of the middle-income countries and in a little more than 90% of the high-income countries. Data concerning the use of questions and question Time as oversight tools are presented respectively in Table 9 and 10. The use committees of enquiry, of interpellations and of the ombudsman offices follows a different pattern. The survey data suggest that the use of interpellations as an oversight tool is very common in high-income countries, less common in low-income countries and least common in middle-income countries : they are used in about 81 % of the high-income cases, in about 77% of the low-income cases, and in less than 70% in the middle-income cases. Data are presented in Table 11 . Finally, the presence of committees of enquiry and of Ombuds offices as oversight tools is most common in middle-income countries, less common in highincome countries and least common in low-income countries. Data concerning the presence of committees of enquiry and of the Ombuds offices by are presented in Table   12 and 13. Oversight Tools and Level of Democracy
The purpose of this section is to investigate the relationship between the level of democracy and the number of oversight tools that are available to the legislature. Before we can do so, however, we need to discuss how our 'democracy' variable is operationalized.
The Freedom House computes an annual index of freedom for all the countries in the world; this index is regarded by many social scientists as a proxy index of democracy; known as Gastil index, it is computed in the following way. The Freedom House assigns to each country a political rights score and a civil liberties score. Both scores are 7-point scales. The index of freedom is estimated by adding a country's political rights score to that country's civil liberties score and by dividing their sum by 2. This means that the Gastil index of freedom is also a seven point scale. So, for example, if the fictional country of Abbaba has a score of 3 for its political rights and of 4 for its civil liberties, then Abbaba's democratic score is (3+4)/2 that is 3.5. Countries that score from 1 to 2.5 points on this scale are considered democratic; countries scoring from 3 to 5.5 are quasi-democratic, while countries with a score of 5.5 or higher belong to the group of nondemocratic countries.
Our 'democracy' variable was constructed by re-coding the Gastil index of freedom by assigning value 1 to democratic countries, value 2 to quasi-democratic countries and value 3 to non-democratic countries. Our second set of findings concerns the relationship between the oversight potential and national per capita income levels. In this respect we found that the oversight potential is greatly affected by the income level. In fact, parliaments in low-income countries have on average a much smaller number of oversight tools at their disposal than their counterparts in both middle-and high-income countries. Interestingly, the oversight potential is not particularly affected by whether the country is middle-or highincome.
Our third set of findings concerns the relationship between the oversight potential and the level of democracy. In this regard we found that the average number of oversight tools is almost linearly related to the level of democracy, so that the more democratic a country, the more oversight tools are at the disposal of that country's parliament. Nondemocratic countries have an average of just 5 oversight tools, quasi-democratic countries have an average of 5.71 oversight tools, and democratic countries have an average of 6.41 oversight tools. What does this mean? Does this mean that the adoption of additional oversight tools makes countries more democratic or does it mean that because countries are already democratic that they adopt additional oversight tools? In other words, is it possible to detect a clear arrow of causality? The data at our disposal and the analyses that can be performed with these data do not allow us to formulate a positive answer for this question. A uni-directional, causal influence cannot be detected.
In addition to these methodological reasons, there are also some theoretical reasons why it may not be possible to answer the question above. It is well known, in the study of social sciences, that the relationship between variables instead of being unidirectional is often bi-directional. This means that one variable (Y) is determined by another variable (X) which, in turn, is determined by (Y). This could very well be the case of the relationship between level of democracy and oversight potential. If what distinguishes democratic regimes from non-democratic ones is that they entail representation, accountability and responsiveness, and if oversight tools are the institutional instruments that contribute to keeping governments accountable, then it is not surprising that democratic countries may want to adopt oversight tools. Yet as a country's oversight potential increases, so does the level of democracy, thus providing a virtuous circle.
Having established that the relationship between the level of democracy and the oversight potential is possibly bi-directional, let us focus on one of the two aspects of the relationship, that is on the fact that as oversight potential increases, so does the level of democracy. This finding has important practical consequences for the international community and those international organizations seeking to reduce global poverty and promote good governance. If democracy is "a condition without which development and poverty reduction strategies could not be properly implemented" 15 , and if oversight tools are the institutional devices that are associated with the transition of countries to full democracies, then it becomes of considerable importance for the international community to better understand the dynamics of parliamentary oversight, the role that oversight tools can play in the promotion of government accountability (and thus, democratic development and good governance) and to identify and disseminate examples of good practice practices. By doing so, the international community contributes to creating the conditions for sustainable long-term development.
This paper contributes to such an understanding by explaining the incidence of parliamentary oversight tools and relating this to important economic and political variables. Further research needs to be undertaken on the effectiveness such tools -but given the difficulties of measuring parliamentary performance across countries 16 such research should perhaps first be through the development of country case studies, attempting to measure changes in effectiveness over time.
